Abstract
Introduction
Any current bibliography of international legal analyses of the relationship between trade and human rights will be replete with the works of Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, many of which put forward a version of the argument which is reflected in the article above. 1 At first glance it is a highly attractive account. At last one encounters a trade lawyer who embraces enthusiastically and wholeheartedly the human rights agenda! At last an international economic law expert who, in a determinedly interdisciplinary way, integrates philosophy, human rights and economic theory; one who seeks to tame the excesses so noisily decried by the anti-globalization protesters of Seattle and subsequent fame. Petersmann embraces the human rights agenda from within the citadel of international economic law and brings his formidable experience as a former legal adviser in the German Ministry of Economic Affairs, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) to bear in the name of an approach which would resolve once and for all the seemingly intractable conflicts between trade and human rights which so bedevil the analyses of other authors. 'Democratic legitimacy' and 'social justice' are both 'defined by human rights' and must therefore be embraced by the 'global integration law' which is pursued by the WTO.
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But despite his consistent invocation of the discourse of human rights -and contrary to the reader's first impressions as well as to Petersmann's own perception of his work -his approach is at best difficult to reconcile with international human rights law and at worst it would undermine it dramatically. In essence, the result of following the approach set out would be to hijack, or more appropriately to Hayek, international human rights law in a way which would fundamentally redefine its contours and make it subject to the libertarian principles expounded by writers such as Friedrich Hayek, Richard Pipes and Randy Barnett.
In light of such a negative assessment it might reasonably be asked whether there is any point in seeking to respond in detail to an analysis with which one disagrees so comprehensively and which, although it has frequently been published before, has drawn so little sustained reaction from other scholars. But there are several strong reasons which argue in favour of a detailed rebuttal of these views. the standard 'stump' speech of a politician which contains the same message and relies on the same content time and time again, but on each occasion is delivered in a slightly different form depending on the audience. This fact probably explains why more than one-fifth of the citations provided in the article above are to the author's own previous writings. 4 The third is that so few scholars have apparently responded to Petersmann's oft-repeated views. Although the literature on trade and human rights (the latter being interpreted as including labour rights) has burgeoned in recent years, 5 remarkably little attention has been given by most of the mainstream writers to Petersmann's thesis. By leaving his thesis only marginally contested there is a significant risk that those who do not have a strong grasp of the complexity of the issues raised by the trade and human rights linkage will assume that his work on this issue enjoys a level of acceptance which it in fact does not.
A fourth reason is that Petersmann has to date been reluctant to engage with those few scholars who have been critical of his work. One such example is provided in the article above.
Steve Peers has presented a detailed, sustained and measured critique of Petersmann's basic and oft-repeated proposition that there is a freestanding human right to trade. 6 Petersmann makes no mention of the Peers article in the two pieces published on the same subject in 2002, 7 but it does attract a footnote in the article above. Peers' analysis is dismissed on the grounds that he wants 'human rights [to] end at national borders' and is opposed to 'constitutional protection' for 'the freedom of transnational economic transactions'. 8 In fact, Peers endorses neither of those propositions, even implicitly. Petersmann has been similarly reluctant to engage with another critique by Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaides, 9 who address several important dimensions of his standard analysis. Their critique focuses on his revisionist reading of Kant, his suggestion that governments should entrench free trade rights at the international level despite the fact that the vast majority of them have not treated trade in that way in their domestic constitutions, and his insistence that an approach which ties the hands of governments by putting the priority of free trade out of reach in democratic debate is consistent with the citizen empowerment of which he is so fond. In reply, Petersmann is content to pose a rhetorical question, based on the title of their article, which is designed to dispose of the matter. He asks, without responding: 'are there convincing arguments that "constitutionalism" is a "fallacy", and "constitutionalizing the WTO a step too far"?'.
10
The final reason for focusing carefully on Petersmann's analyses is that the relationship between human rights and trade is one of the central issues confronting international lawyers at the beginning of the twenty-first century and any proposal which purports to marry, almost symbiotically, the two concerns warrants careful consideration. As George Soros has recently written: 'The WTO opened up a Pandora's box when it became involved in intellectual property rights. If intellectual property rights are a fit subject for the WTO, why not labor rights, or human 
Some Methodological Shortcomings
In marked contrast to his earlier pathbreaking work on GATT law, Petersmann's analyses of this issue are open to strong challenge on both methodological and substantive grounds. I will address the latter in terms of six propositions which I believe encapsulate his approach. But before doing so, it is appropriate to note some of the methodological weaknesses which characterize not only the article above but also the general body of his previous work on which it draws. The principal shortcoming is highlighted by Howse when he comments that 'it is impossible to disagree with many of Petersmann's propositions' essentially because they are stated at such a 'high level of abstraction'. This is well illustrated by the concept of 'constitutionalism' which infuses all of his writings in this area but which, as Howse demonstrates, remains essentially undefined. 12 In one of his most recent writings Petersmann provides instead a survey of just under three pages which spans the 'historical evolution of constitutionalism', starting with Plato and Aristotle and moving through Cromwell, Montesquieu, Gianotti, and others, and concluding with Rawls. 13 Petersmann's preferred technique is to identify an issue, make a strong assertion, invoke perhaps one source, and then move on to the next issue. The views attributed to the authors whose work is invoked in order to justify these assertions -ranging from Kant has been identified in a particular locus (one of the thimbles) and the reader wants to engage in a critical debate on the merits, Petersmann moves the analysis -just as the reader might have begun to realize that the pea was not really under the thimble in question but was elsewhere. In other words, the focus of the debate keeps shifting so that when its shortcomings are about to become obvious the focus is moved elsewhere and the totality of the arguments are assumed to be persuasive where none of the individual parts was. This is particularly marked in relation to the basis of the claim that the right to free trade is already to be found in one body of law or another.
A third methodological shortcoming, linked to the other two, is a certain historical revisionism, which enables Petersmann to view events rather selectively so that they fit conveniently into his grand scheme of things. 
Constructing the Argument
At the substantive level Petersmann's thesis can be encapsulated in six propositions, although he has not specifically spelled it out in such terms. The propositions are:
(a) Human rights have constituted an integral part of the momentum for European integration.
(b) Human rights and market freedoms are, in effect, one and the same thing.
(c) Human rights, including 'economic liberty rights', are part of binding international law.
(d) There is a 'worldwide integration law' which is, or should be, based on the EU model, which has been, inter alia, 'citizen-oriented'.
(e) The WTO would protect human rights more effectively than any other international institutional arrangements.
(f) A United Nations 'global compact' which encourages the WTO and the IMF to promote human rights is the best way forward.
I now turn to examine the validity of each of these propositions.
A. Human Rights Have Constituted an Integral Part of the Momentum for European Integration
In essence Petersmann's call for the 'constitutionalization' of world trade amounts to a prescription for implementing, at the global level, the approach which he considers to have been so successful at the European level. His prescription of a worldwide integration law based on human rights proceeds from the premise that the European model has historically had a major human rights component. According to his account, the EC's special recipe for the achievement of integration has involved 'the recognition and empowerment of citizens as legal subjects not only of human rights but also of competition law …'. 18 The EU model is one which complements 'human rights guarantees by liberal trade and competition rules conferring individual rights on EC citizens'. 19 The process has been driven by a '"functional theory" underlying European integration [which is] that economic market integration' can enable 'more comprehensive and more effective protection of human rights than has been possible in traditional state-centred international law'. 20 The outcome of this process is that 'EU law has evolved into a comprehensive constitutional system for the protection of civil, political, economic and social rights of EU citizens across national frontiers'.
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But this account is highly problematic, for several reasons. The first is that it is historically incorrect. Human rights were, on virtually all accounts of the evolution of European integration through the common market, an afterthought. They were not mentioned at all in the Against this background, it is puzzling that Petersmann could speak of the EU approach to balancing human rights and economic freedoms as 'a model for "constitutionalizing" … worldwide integration law by integrating civil, political and economic liberties, constitutional law and comparative law'. 30 Unless, of course, despite his insistence that human rights must be the pre-eminent values, he really does want the unbalanced EU approach, which has, at least to date, privileged economic freedoms over human rights, to prevail also at the international level. But at the very least the non-revisionist story of the unfolding of the place of human rights within EU integration law provides a strong lesson in the complexity of reconciling these two areas of law and cautions against uncritical assertions that the EU has attained any sort of ideal equilibrium.
B. Human Rights and Market Freedoms Are, in Effect, One and the Same Thing
The meaning attributed to human rights and related terms is crucial to an understanding of Petersmann's approach, but they are rarely defined with any precision. This becomes especially problematic in relation to terms such as 'human rights', 'fundamental rights', 'economic rights', 'economic liberties', and 'economic freedoms', all of which appear at different times in his analysis. For the most part they seem to be used interchangeably, although from both a philosophical and a legal perspective there are enormous differences among them. In response to the first of these questions, Peers has provided a detailed account of the relevant jurisprudence, which leads him to the conclusion that although the Court alluded to a right to trade in one case, it is, in the overall context, 'an odd reference, which the court has been reluctant to repeat'. 35 His analysis leads firmly to a negative answer to the first question. In the 33 See Petersmann, in CMLR, supra note 3, at 1375 (emphasis in original).
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Petersmann, in von Bogdandy et al., supra note 3, at 387.
article above Petersmann seeks to dismiss this critique by suggesting that Peers' position is that 'no right to trade deserves to be recognized'. But in fact he takes this statement entirely out of context. It comes at the end of a lengthy analysis of whether such a right has already been recognized (he concludes convincingly that it has not) and thus how it might in the future come to be recognized. Peers concludes that:
If the advocates of recognition of a new 'right to trade' cannot win the argument in the normal forums available for the development of international or national human rights law, no 'right to trade' deserves to be recognized.
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Thus the quote that Petersmann attributes to Peers, and on the basis of which he dismisses his analysis, is misleading and does not convey the essence of Peers' position.
The second question concerns the human rights status of the market freedoms upon which the EC has been constructed. They include, in particular, the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Leaving aside the fact that Petersmann strategically omits the free movement of persons from his approach, the issue is whether these principles, which the ECJ's jurisprudence has gradually turned into fundamental freedoms, have also thereby acquired the status of human rights? Within the field of EU law, some authors have attributed to these freedoms 'a quasi-human rights character'. 37 But even this does not get us as far as the proposition for which Petersmann argues. If the Court has really treated these principles as full-fledged human rights, there would presumably be instances in which one right has been held to prevail over another and thus in which, for example, the right to free movement of goods would have prevailed over a traditional human right such as the right to association or the right to privacy. But in so far as this can be said to have On the one hand they have a de-humanizing element in treating workers as `factors of production' on par with goods, services and capital. But they are also part of a matrix which prohibits, for example, discrimination on grounds of nationality, and encourages generally a rich network of transnational social transactions'. forward. According to Pipes, 'the main enemy of freedom is not tyranny but the striving for equality'. 48 In his view, the welfare state project of the twentieth century subjected the institution of private property to a relentless attack which has undermined it and thus also individual liberty.
In line with such thinking, Petersmann notes that poverty in developing countries 'is attributed by many economists to their lack of effective human rights guarantees and of liberal trade and competition laws', which leads him to focus not on freedom of speech or the right to association, and certainly not on social rights, but rather on the absence of 'effective legal and judicial protection of liberty rights and property rights'. 49 Since he has defined liberty rights as freedom of contract and property rights, the real focus of his concept of human rights is remarkably narrow and the most striking characteristic of his references to social rights is their incompatibility with almost all of the remainder of his analysis. In his scheme of things, the WTO is never going to be called on to promote social rights, which means that despite the homage paid to them they remain entirely marginal to the essential thrust of his proposals. But whatever the shortcomings of this analysis from an international law point of view, the real problem is the use to which it is put. In essence Petersmann seeks to set up a logical progression which moves from the statement that there is a core of universally recognized rights to the proposition that these rights must thus be respected by international organizations, to the conclusion that his favoured list of human rights will thus trump anything else that governments or international organizations might seek to do.
Are international organizations as such obligated to respect human rights? Although it is a proposition to which almost any proponent of human rights would be sympathetic, this does not overcome the fact that it remains contentious from a legal point of view and has been explicitly disputed by the international legal advisers of many of the key agencies, including the World Bank and the IMF. As a general statement of principle it should be unproblematic, but the difficulties begin when one seeks to identify the specific legal arguments which underpin the asserted obligation. Petersmann begins this task by stating that 'international legal practice confirms an opinio iuris that UN membership entails legal obligations to respect core human rights'. Although this statement applies only to governments, since they alone can achieve UN membership, the analysis quickly moves on to embrace also the actions of 'intergovernmental' actors and the obligations of 'all national and international governments' (a term which, happily, remains undefined) to respect human rights. The endpoint of this analysis is that human rights 'today constitutionally restrain all national and international rule-making powers'.
From whence does this obligation derive? The first source cited is the ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. But apart from the fact that this Declaration deals only with labour rights and not with human rights in general (whereas Petersmann's proposals are
clearly not aimed at strengthening labour rights), the Annex to the Declaration states specifically that it 'is of a strictly promotional nature'. 53 Although there is intentional ambiguity in terms of their legal characterization, and some ILO officials and governmental representatives would clearly be happy if the Principles were to crystallize into customary international law, this is
certainly not yet the case.
The second source is 'UN human rights law' which, it is said, 'explicitly recognizes … that human rights entail obligations also for intergovernmental organizations'. The only authority offered for that broad proposition is Article 28 of the UDHR. This provision states that 'Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.' It thus addresses in only the most oblique way the issue at hand and an extended and careful argument would be required to derive from it, in a manner that would be convincing to an international lawyer, anything close to the proposition that Petersmann claims it 'explicitly recognizes'.
D. There Is a 'Worldwide Integration Law' which Is, or Should Be, Based on the EU Model, which Has Been, inter alia, 'Citizen-Driven'
The term 'worldwide integration law' recurs frequently in Petersmann's writings. 54 Although it remains undefined, the model is clearly that of the EU and it seems to involve 'the recognition and empowerment of citizens as legal subjects not only of human rights but also of competition agreements'. 66 The reality of course is more complex. Many of the EU's initiatives in these areas have been driven by narrow self-interest rather than by any abstract commitment to the promotion of economic liberties. In so far as this latter term is intended to cover human rights initiatives in general, the assertion neglects to take account of the EU's failure to ensure that all of its members have ratified the European Social Charter, its failure to have insisted on such ratification as a prerequisite for admission to the Union, its resistance to efforts to ensure that EUbased transnational corporations are required to respect human rights in their activities, its members' rejection of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, its inclusion of respect for minority rights in the conditions to be met by new members while those rights are marginal to its own arrangements and are virtually absent from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 67 or its reticence about human rights matters in general, let alone social rights, in the framework of the activities of the IMF and the World Bank.
The EU is not exactly the persistently virtuous actor in international affairs as it is portrayed by Petersmann.
E. The WTO Would Protect Human Rights More Effectively than Any Other International

Institutional Arrangements
The first step in this part of Petersmann's argument is to criticize or discredit the UN's human rights arrangements, thus setting the scene for them to be replaced by the WTO as the principal means by which to promote respect for human rights. Having sought to establish that the EU is citizen-driven, he then contrasts it with the 'UN-directed international community', which is characterized as 'state-centred' and 'authoritarian'. 68 There is no small irony in this characterization, given that the process that Petersmann advocates is in effect the top-down Cremer, supra note 3, at 291, note 1.
imposition by elites of a rigid commitment to free trade. The next step is to criticize the 'lack of judicial safeguards, not only in the UN Charter but also in the various UN human rights covenants, for the protection of human rights and the rule of law at the national and international levels' and to argue that these weaknesses confirm 'the power-oriented structure of UN law, one that does not take human rights seriously'. 69 In fact, it is true that the implementation arrangements reflected in the principal UN human rights treaties are much weaker than they should be, but the reason is that governments have steadfastly and very openly refused to develop the system any further. For some reason Petersmann assumes that the very same governments, acting within the framework of the WTO, would take a dramatically different attitude to a proposal purporting to achieve the result which they have adamantly opposed in the human rights setting.
The WTO forum is praised as the one that would promote EU-style 'economic market integration', which leads to 'more comprehensive and more effective promotion of human rights than has been possible in traditional state-centred international law'. 70 And yet the WTO is very much a part of a state-centred international legal system. Indeed, to take but one example, it is so state-centred that it has sought strongly to discourage the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs by the Appellate Body, despite the latter's expressed wish to make use of them.
Petersmann's faith in the WTO is largely justified by the oft-repeated assertion that the Organization has 'constitutionalized' trade law on the basis of '"rule-of-law"; compulsory adjudication; "checks and balances" between legislative, executive and judicial powers; and the legal primacy of the WTO "Constitution" …'. 71 Without wishing to engage in a debate over whether the WTO system really reflects an ideal checks and balances approach, it is nevertheless useful to ask how the WTO promotes the rule of law. That concept is referred to 26 times in the article above and Petersmann considers that the WTO promotes the rule of law 'more effectively than any other worldwide treaty'. 72 It does this through 'its unique compulsory dispute settlement 69 Ibid, at 292. 70 Petersmann, at 631. 71 Petersmann, in JIEL (2000), supra note 3, at 24. and appellate review system, and its compulsory guarantees of access to domestic courts'. 73 But any conception of the rule of law -defined by Dicey as 'the universal subjection of all classes to one law', 74 or by Hayek as the possibility 'to foresee with fair certainty how the [government] will use its coercive powers' 75 -which contents itself with mechanisms for the enforcement of trade rules risks reducing the concept almost to vanishing point. Petersmann's conception of the rule of law seems not only to be devoid of the substantive content which Ronald Dworkin, let alone the International Commission of Jurists, would insist should be part of it, but one which is not even complete in any narrow procedural sense of the term. Given Petersmann's affinity with, and regular references to, Hayek, 76 and the fact that the rule of law is one of the leitmotifs of the latter's work, one might expect that he would share that conception. But the inclusion of social rights in Petersmann's accounts of his project makes it incoherent for him to rely in this respect upon Hayek, who drew great satisfaction from the fact that 'those who pursue distributive justice will in practice find themselves obstructed at every move by the rule of law' as he had defined it.
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As Fallon has observed, although the concept of the rule of law remains much celebrated, its precise meaning 'may be less clear today than ever before' and its modern-day invocations are 'typically too vague and conclusory to dispel lingering puzzlement'. http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/annotated.pdf.
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Petersmann, at 639. 81 Ibid, at 649.
benchmark for the law of worldwide economic organizations and for a rights-based market economy and jurisprudence … '. 83 Similarly, he laments the fact that the Covenant 'does not protect the economic freedoms, property rights, non-discriminatory conditions of competition and the rule of law necessary for a welfare-increasing division of labour satisfying consumer demand through private investments and the efficient supply of goods, services and job opportunities'.
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For him then the solution is straightforward. It is to give the principal responsibility for promoting, interpreting, and even implementing these and the other core UN human rights standards to the WTO while insisting that it is capable of pursuing an integrated vision which remains faithful to the dictates of human rights law.
But this process of human rights-based (or more accurately human rights justified)
'constitutionalization' of the WTO is a highly contentious one. While it is true that some human rights, and many labour rights, proponents would like to see a significant role for the Organization in these respects, their suggestions stop considerably short of Petersmann's vision.
The reason is simply that while the former might argue for a much greater sensitivity on the part of the institutions of the WTO to human rights values, or even for sanctions to be adopted by the WTO against member countries which violate these, they certainly do not see it as an Organization which is designed, structured, or suitable to operate in the way that one with major human rights responsibilities would. The Agreement Establishing the WTO is not a constitutional instrument in the sense of constituting a political or social community, 85 and its mandate and objectives are narrowly focused around the goal of 'expanding the production of and trade in goods and services'. Despite the expansion of the original GATT mandate into areas such as the services industries and intellectual property rights, and proposals to expand its role to cover the enforcement of regimes at the national level which are favourable to international foreign investment, the basic structure of the Organization has remained unchanged. It is an institution which is dominated by producers, and in which the economic, social, cultural, political and various other interests of a great many people are not, in practice, represented. Its institutional structure, its processes and the outcomes it sanctions are far from what would be required of a 83 Ibid, at 628-629. 
F. A United Nations 'Global Compact' which Encourages the WTO and the IMF to Promote Human Rights Is the Best Way Forward
One of the most practical proposals that Petersmann puts forward is that the UN should launch 'a "Global Compact" committing all worldwide organizations to respect for human rights, the rule of law, democracy and "good governance" in their collective exercise of government powers'.
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There is something to be said for an initiative which would commit all of these agencies to respect human rights in all of their activities, but is doubtful that the most appealing model is that of the existing Global Compact between business and the UN. It is defined by the latter as not being 'a regulatory instrument or code of conduct, but a value-based platform designed to promote institutional learning. It utilizes the power of transparency and dialogue to identify and disseminate good practices based on universal principles'. 88 Without entering into the many criticisms that have been made of the Compact as a toothless tiger or window-dressing, it must suffice to say that the UN and the various specialized agencies already have endless dialogues designed to promote policy coordination and it is difficult to see how the addition of one new one, albeit termed a Global Compact, would be more successful in relation to human rights when other dialogues have yet to be especially productive. But the more puzzling nature of the proposal is that it reduces the focus to a very soft and dialogue-based effort to promote human rights, 86 Petersmann, in de Búrca and Scott (eds), supra note 3, at 109-110. Fifth, Petersmann does not squarely confront the consequences of adopting a Kantian approach to participation in the UN or in the WTO. 115 An insistence that only democratic governments could participate would in fact defer the implementation of Petersmann's programme almost indefinitely since a great many countries would need to be expelled from both organizations and their readmission would be dependent upon their attainment and maintenance of a democratic form of government. How an assessment of whether they are 'democratic' would be made, and by whom, are questions to which Petersmann does not seem to have given much thought, although the despair that he expresses in response to the politicization of the UN's human rights system would presumably make him loathe to let any of those bodies make the decisions. Perhaps he would want such matters to be determined by the judiciary in whom he has such faith, but it is unlikely that any governments, including those of the exemplary EU, would divest themselves of such crucial decision-making authority.
At the end of what Petersmann would call a long Kantian road the reader must ask why the author has felt the need to invoke the name of Kant so often. Several reasons might be suggested. The intention might be to provide an analytical framework for the overall analysis, or it might be to draw a firm contrast with other philosophical approaches which have been rejected, or it might be to more closely identify with other writers who have developed the same approach.
But Petersmann does not seem to use Kant for any of these purposes. Instead the objective seems to be to provide a philosophical gloss and the intimation of a theoretical framework in support of the otherwise blunt assertions of the author's main belief, which is that a right to free trade is the panacea which will bring wealth and liberty to all mankind. In other words, Kant's philosophy is 114 E.g. the debate about whether the Kantian concept is primarily about duties and cannot easily be extended to embrace rights. On this 'highly controversial' point see Capps, supra note 98, at note 9.
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Although he has asked some of the questions that arise in this respect, he has proffered no answers. See Petersmann, in Cremer, supra note 3, at 304-305.
actually superfluous to the analysis, but is invoked to give it an intellectually more compelling tone.
Conclusion
Ernst Petersmann's proposal to privilege the right to property recalls the arguments put forward over the years by Richard Epstein, who has long advocated an interpretation of the fifth amendment to the US Constitution (the so-called 'takings clause' which prohibits the taking of private property 'for public use without just compensation'), which would give far greater protection to property rights than they currently enjoy and would result in the overriding of many of the social and labour rights which currently exist under US law. 120 In these respects, Petersmann's proposals are hardly novel.
The principal problem with his approach, however, is that it is presented as though it were simply a logical development of existing policies, rather than representing a dramatic break with them. In a form of epistemological misappropriation he takes the discourse of international human rights law and uses it to describe an agenda which has a fundamentally different ideological underpinning. Thus, his proposals are presented as: involving a relatively minor adaptation of existing human rights law; amounting to little more than the transposition of a balanced and proven EU policy on human rights and trade; being entirely consistent with widely accepted conceptions of constitutionalism and the rule of law; being fully compatible with the recognition of a wide range of social rights; and being a straightforward application of Kantian principles. But as the preceding analysis has sought to show, none of these characterizations is accurate. Rather than waiting for these radical changes to occur within our lifetimes it would seem to be more productive to pursue the debate over the appropriate relationship between trade and 
